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THE ANATOMY OF A SEARCH: INTRUSIVENESS AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Renge McDonald Hutchins *
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two months beginning in late December of 2005,
police officers in New York State continuously monitored the loca-
tion and movements of Scott Weaver's van using a surreptitiously
attached global positioning system ("GPS") device, known as a "Q-
ball."' The reason Weaver was targeted for police surveillance has
never been disclosed. 2 In addition, law enforcement made no at-
tempt to justify the heightened scrutiny of Weaver by seeking the
pre-authorization of a warrant from a neutral magistrate.3 Ra-
ther, for sixty-five days, the police subjected Weaver to intense
surveillance without oversight, interruption, or explanation. 4
More than a year after the round-the-clock tracking ended,
Weaver was charged with, and convicted of, two burglaries.5 At
trial, the prosecution introduced evidence obtained from the Q-
ball.6 The defense fought to keep the evidence out, asserting that
the placement and monitoring of the Q-ball constituted an im-
permissible search under state and federal law. 7 The trial court
* Assistant Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. For comments on earlier
drafts, I thank Richard Boldt, Michael Van Alstine, the members of the University of
Maryland School of Law's Faculty Development Workshop, the members of the Mid-
Atlantic Criminal Law Research Collective, and the Faculty Workshop at the University of
North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill.
1. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1195-96 (N.Y. 2009).
2. Id. at 1196.
3. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (No. 2009-0053).
4. Id. at5-6.
5. Id. at 2.
6. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
7. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 3, at 49-50.
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rejected this claim.8 But in 2009, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the police action constituted an unconstitu-
tional search. 9 Though the New York court extensively discussed
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
it ultimately grounded its decision in the protections afforded by
the state constitution. 10 The court overturned Weaver's conviction
and ordered a new trial (from which the GPS tracking evidence
will be excluded)."
Five days before the New York decision was issued, the inter-
mediate appellate state court in Wisconsin also considered the po-
lice use of GPS tracking to keep tabs on a suspect. 12 The Wiscon-
sin court, in direct conflict with the New York court's conclusions,
determined that "neither a search nor a seizure occurs when the
police use a GPS device to track a vehicle while it is visible to the
general public.' 13 Conducting its own assessment of the con-
straints imposed by the Fourth Amendment, the Wisconsin court
equated the GPS device with the tracking beepers evaluated by
the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Karo
and United States v. Knotts.14 Finding that the two devices per-
formed essentially the same function, the Wisconsin court con-
cluded that no constitutional protection should be afforded.5 Ac-
cordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. 6
The decisions in People v. Weaver and State v. Sveum tell us far
more than that New York and Wisconsin courts do not see eye to
eye. The decisions are significant because they remind us that
courts continue to wrestle with the appropriate treatment of novel
technologies. The cases are also important because they illustrate
8. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
9. See id. at 1203.
10. Id. at 1202.
11. Id. at 1203.
12. State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
13. Id. at 58.
14. Id. (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708-10, 715-18, 718 n.5 (1984);
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983)).
15. Id. at 59. In 1996, prior to the charges at issue in the 2009 Wisconsin case, Mi-
chael Sveum had been convicted of stalking Jamie Johnson. Id. at 56. Sveum was sent to
prison for related crimes. Id. In 1999, with the help of his sister and before his release,
Sveum resumed his stalking of Johnson. Id. In 2002, he was released from prison and con-
tinued his stalking behavior. Id. In early 2003, Johnson alerted police of her concerns that
the stalking had resumed. Id. While investigating Johnson's complaint, the police attached
a GPS device to his car. Id.
16. Id. at 59-60.
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the two avenues most often taken by state courts in the absence
of further guidance from the Supreme Court. The first avenue-
taken by the New York court-involves a state court opining
about a just result under the U.S. Constitution but then retreat-
ing to its own state constitution to define the appropriate level of
protection.17 The alternate route-taken by the Wisconsin court-
relies upon the analytical apparatus of analogy. Specifically, the
Wisconsin court recounted conclusions regarding an earlier gen-
eration of surveillance equipment and then, without extended
analysis, determined that comparable treatment was warranted
in the case before it.18 Retreating to state constitutions and draw-
ing analogies to previously considered forms of surveillance
create at least two problems.
First, as state courts increasingly look to their own constitu-
tions to define the floor of protection, we are left with a patch-
work of decisions that tolerates wildly conflicting treatment of
near-identical police conduct. The New York and Wisconsin deci-
sions are a conspicuous example of this predicament.19 Similarly,
the lower federal courts are left to maneuver the sometimes ob-
scure doctrinal outlines drawn by the Court. Where a clear path
does not always connect one of the Court's search cases to the
next, it will be little surprise if the same patchwork developing in
the states is soon seen at the lower federal level. To the outside
observer, the seeming randomness of the decisions undermines
public perception of the system by allowing judicial opinions to be
viewed not as the objective application of well-reasoned analysis,
but as the implementation of individual judicial agendas. Moreo-
ver, at the street level, the seeming randomness of the decisions
deprives law enforcement officers of objective and easy-to-apply
rules that would better allow them to forecast permissible and
impermissible police conduct.
Second, allowing the Court's assessment of earlier generations
of surveillance technology to mechanically determine our toler-
ance of future generations of surveillance technology is proble-
matic because in many cases the old conclusions fail to account
for the greater intrusion occasioned by newer models. Therefore,
17. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1202-03 (N.Y. 2009).
18. Sueum, 769 N.W.2d at 58-59 (citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 708-10, 715-18, 718 n.5;
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85).
19. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202-03; Sveum, 769 N.W.2d at 58-59.
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allowing the Court's earlier constitutional treatment of a less in-
trusive technique to reflexively mandate the constitutional
treatment of a new technology undermines privacy protections.
In this essay, I contend that when evaluating the constitutio-
nality of enhanced surveillance devices, the existing test for as-
sessing the occurrence of a Fourth Amendment search should be
modified. Specifically, I suggest that intrusiveness20 should be
unambiguously adopted by the Court as the benchmark for as-
sessing and defining the existence of a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, intrusiveness should be clearly defined to
require an examination of two factors: the functionality of a chal-
lenged form of surveillance and the potential for disclosure
created by the device.21
The modification that I propose hopefully infuses a bit more ri-
gidity into the test for evaluating new technologies under the
Fourth Amendment, while at the same time retaining much of
the desirable flexibility of Katz's reasonableness inquiry. Adopt-
ing my proposed modification would allow state and lower federal
courts to resolve questions raised by novel technologies in a more
uniform manner and would enable them to avoid ill-suited analo-
gies to earlier forms of enhanced surveillance. The modification
also builds upon, rather than clearly breaks with, existing law,
making its adoption feasible. Because my proposal about where
the law should be is built upon my assessment of where the law
is, a discussion of the existing law is perhaps a good place to
start.
20. As discussed in greater detail below, see infra Part III, intrusiveness is defined to
mean the character and quantity of information potentially revealed by a surveillance
technique. See also Rende McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 431-32 (2007). Other scholars have pro-
posed competing definitions of intrusiveness. For example, Professor Slobogin proposes
that intrusiveness be defined with reference to public opinion. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
32-33 (2007).
21. I do not seek to clarify, at this time, the method for evaluating whether a seizure
has occurred. The Court looks to different criteria for evaluating the existence of a seizure.
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572 (1988) ("[Any assessment as to whether police
conduct amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account
'all of the circumstances surrounding the incident.... .'" (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 215 (1984)). Consequently, considering the character and quantity of information re-
vealed by government surveillance would tell us little about whether an individual has
been "seized" within the meaning of the amendment.
[Vol. 44:11851188
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II. How WE CURRENTLY DEFINE SEARCHES: KATZ AND THE
RISE OF OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches is just one mechanism for protecting citizens against un-
justified governmental invasions. 22 The amendment's plain lan-
guage suggests a two-part analysis in which a court first deter-
mines whether a search has occurred and, if so, then determines
whether that search was unreasonable-and therefore constitu-
tionally objectionable. 23 However, in answering the first question,
the Supreme Court decoupled the existence of a search from a
bare examination of police conduct, and instead determined that
courts should examine whether a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy existed-if not, then no search has occurred 4.2 Further compli-
cating matters, the Court has determined that constitutional rea-
sonableness should largely be equated with pre-authorization by
a warrant.2 As a result, if conduct is defined as a search, it has
largely become perforce unreasonable absent a warrant.26 If con-
duct is not defined as a search, it is considered free of the
amendment's strictures."
Since their inception, there has been much debate over both
the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the warrant re-
quirement. They have been both lauded as desirable constitution-
al mandates and pilloried as baseless judicial constructs.2 s How-
ever, whatever position one takes on the merits, there can be
little dispute that the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis
that has developed in the shadow of the warrant requirement is
22. There is a decades-long debate over whether the Court or Congress is best posi-
tioned to regulate sense-enhanced searches. Compare Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amend-
ment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 801, 806 (2004) (advancing legislative supremacy), with Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 379 (1974) (criticizing legis-
lative supremacy). I have argued previously that the Fourth Amendment should take the
leading oar in defining the appropriate contours of searches. Hutchins, supra note 20, at
454. This essay, therefore, begins with the baseline assumption that constitutional limits
are the preferred course.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
25. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
26. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
28. See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is
Made Of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 783-85 (2008).
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not terribly transparent.29 The legal conclusion that a search has
occurred is now significantly impacted by the Court's desire (or
lack thereof) to saddle law enforcement with the burden of obtain-
ing a warrant. Oftentimes, the Court appears to work backwards
from its desired result to determine whether a reasonable expec-
tation existed." Moreover, the malleability of the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test has facilitated the opacity. As a result,
great dissatisfaction with the Court's search jurisprudence has
developed. Though there are many places one might choose to be-
gin remedying the problem,'31 this essay proposes that we start by
refining the loosely articulated (but increasingly more relevant)
objective reasonableness prong.
The Supreme Court's 1967 decision in United States v. Katz
marked a shift in the doctrinal conception of a constitutionally
significant search.2 The reasonable expectation of privacy test
adopted in Katz is a two-part test that references, first, the sub-
jective expectations of the defendant, and, second, the objective
reasonableness of the defendant's desires23 Therefore, post-Katz,
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment came to be de-
fined as a governmental intrusion upon a subjective expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to embrace as objectively rea-
sonable.3 In applying the test, the reviewing court considers first
whether an individual has behaved in a manner that is consistent
with a desire for privacy.35 If the individual has, the court then
considers whether that demonstrated desire for privacy is one
29. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Katz at Forty: A Sociological Jurisprudence Whose
Time Has Come, 41 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 935, 948-50 (2008).
30. The Court recently conceded that it has on occasion found a search, in the plain
sense of that word, to be a non-search for constitutional purposes. Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). According to Justice Scalia, this tendency is driven by the Court's
desire to preserve "somewhat more intact" the presumption that warrantless searches are
unconstitutional. Id. The clarification that I propose clearly cannot cure the Court's ten-
dency to deliberately obfuscate. However, by importing greater rigor into the formula used
to define searches, such deliberate obfuscation should become more difficult, or at least
more transparent.
31. For example, Professor Sherry F. Colb in her thoughtful article, What Is a Search?
Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55
STAN. L. REV. 119, 122-24 (2002), suggests that we might right our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence by ceasing to equate a knowing risk of exposure with an invitation to expose
and by refusing to treat a limited disclosure as the moral equivalent of a universal broad-
cast.
32. See 389 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1967).
33. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-43 (1988).
[Vol. 44:11851190
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that warrants the protection of the law." Exhaustive analysis of
Katz (and the test that it generated) has been presented in aca-
demic journals many times over," and I will not retread that fa-
miliar ground. However, what has garnered substantially less
scholarly consideration is the significant shift in application of
the two prongs of Katz-a shift that starkly favors objective rea-
sonableness over subjective expectations.
Increasingly, significant analysis of the first prong of the Katz
test is noticeably absent from the Court's search jurisprudence.
While the subjective expectation prong of Katz is, at least official-
ly, still viable, in practice it is given little consideration.38 Indeed,
a common complaint is that with the first step of the test becom-
ing increasingly irrelevant, the absence of a clear definition for
"objective reasonableness" at the second step creates unpredicta-
ble, and, at times, indefensible results. For example, contrary to
common sense notions, police actions like tracking the numbers
that you dial on your telephone or subjecting your luggage to a
dog sniff have been deemed non-searches under the Katz test.
3 9
Even the Court has noted that society's communal assessment of
whether privacy is justified will alternately trump both a clearly
expressed individual desire for seclusion and a personal belief
that privacy does not exist."° As early as 1984, the Supreme Court
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 28, at 785-92.
38. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 29, at 948.
39. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
744 (1979).
40. The Court has repeatedly noted that even significant efforts by an individual to
keep an area concealed are not alone sufficient to justify constitutional protection. See,
e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448, 450 (1989) (finding no Fourth Amendment appli-
cation despite respondent's efforts to conceal the contents of his greenhouse-efforts which
included placing the greenhouse on five acres of private property, enclosing two sides of
the greenhouse with walls, and enclosing the other two sides with trees, shrubs and res-
pondent's trailer home, and covering ninety percent of the roof of the greenhouse with
translucent and opaque panels); Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-40 (refusing to extend Fourth
Amendment protection despite an acknowledgment that respondents "did not expect that
the contents of their garbage bags would become known to the police or other members of
the public"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 213-14 (1986) (refusing to find a jus-
tifiable expectation of privacy, though Ciraolo had constructed two fences around the en-
tire perimeter of his property-the first six feet tall and the second ten feet tall); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984) (declining to extend Fourth Amendment pro-
tection despite a finding that "Oliver and ... Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal
activities, planted the marihuana upon secluded land and erected fences and 'No Tres-
passing' signs around the property"). The Court has also found that a legitimate expecta-
tion may exist even if the target of government surveillance does not "in fact entertain any
actual expectation of privacy." Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5.
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suggested that it had always elevated analysis of the objective
reasonableness prong over consideration of subjective expecta-
tions.41
There are at least two plausible explanations for why dimi-
nished use of the subjective expectations prong might be occur-
ring. First, it could be said that the diminished focus on subjec-
tive expectations is driven by the practical reality that
individuals rarely engage in criminal conduct without taking at
least nominal efforts to avoid detection. 4" It is, therefore, the rare
case where some showing of a desire for personal privacy is not
manifest.43 Under these circumstances, treating the subjective
expectation prong as an equal partner in the analysis would force
the Court to engage in unreasonable contortions to avoid inap-
propriate application of the Fourth Amendment.
However, a more comprehensive explanation for the shift is an
observation the Supreme Court made nearly three decades ago.
When an individual expectation of what privacy is does not com-
port with our communal expectations of what privacy ought to be,
the normative inquiry must prevail." This is because an analyti-
cal structure that gives significant weight to subjective expecta-
tions alternately protects too much and too little.45
Defining constitutional protection by considering only an indi-
vidual's desires could lead to ridiculous outcomes. For example, if
the scope of the Fourth Amendment was defined exclusively by
considering what the targeted individual wanted, police officers
41. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984); see also United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) ("Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particu-
lar defendants in particular situations may be .... Our problem, in terms of the principles
announced in Katz, is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable.'"); id.
at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for
subjective expectations .... [W]e should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and
risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.").
42. It bears mention that criminal cases are not the only matters that implicate the
Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. See, e.g., Peter Price,
Comment, When Is a Police Officer an Officer of the Law?: The Status of Police Officers in
Schools, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541, 568 (2009) (discussing searches by school offi-
cials). However, with the presumptive remedy being exclusion of the illegally searched or
seized evidence, the overwhelming majority of cases raising Fourth Amendment concerns
are now those involving the state or federal prosecution of crimes.
43. Gruber, supra note 28, at 792 (observing that "there should be a near presumption
of subjective expectation of privacy, given that every case involves illegal behavior, some-
thing people presumably seek to keep clandestine").
44. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740-41 n.5.
45. Cf. Kerr, supra note 22, at 808.
1192 [Vol. 44:1185
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could be expected to ignore criminal acts committed on deserted
public streets.
Conversely, as the Supreme Court recognized in Smith v.
Maryland, relying too heavily upon the subjective expectation
prong might "provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment
protection."46 This is because giving substantial weight to the first
prong of the test can tend to diminish the range of official intru-
sions that can be addressed by the amendment.
The concern identified by the Smith Court is significant. As
some justices and many scholars have recognized, the govern-
ment can easily manipulate subjective expectations. By simply
broadcasting a new surveillance regime, the government can
eliminate an entire zone of privacy the populace previously en-
joyed (e.g., all carry-on luggage at the airport is subject to physi-
cal search), or it can alter the natural development of societal ex-
pectations such that the population never anticipates a zone of
privacy at all (e.g., all new model cellular phones must be
equipped to allow pinpoint location tracking whenever the tele-
phone is turned on).47 Where our individual desires are condi-
tioned by a modern culture that has grown accustomed to traffic
cameras and information technology screeners, giving considera-
ble weight to an individual forecast of the scope of privacy rights
allows for the incremental diminution of constitutional protec-
tions.48 As we become increasingly accustomed to, and accepting
of, a variety of intrusions upon our privacy,49 the zone of behavior
considered constitutionally defensible shrinks to the extent that
zone is calculated by significant reliance upon the first prong of
Katz.
46. 442 U.S. at 740-41 n.5.
47. The Court in Smith v. Maryland cited time spent under totalitarian regimes and
hypothetical announcements of future civil liberties restrictions by the government as two
possible reasons for improperly diminished expectations of privacy on an individual level.
Id. The Court did not, however, suggest that these were the only methods of reducing sub-
jective expectations. Today, increased awareness of the enhanced intrusiveness of technol-
ogy as a result of popular media coverage, movies, and books is arguably an even greater
threat to subjective expectations of privacy than the examples highlighted by the Smith
Court.
48. See id.; cf. Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need a New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 951, 960 (2009) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER SLOBAGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (commenting upon the
role of the media in shaping public perceptions about privacy)).
49. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004) (discussing privacy expectations in the digital age).
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It is in response to the above concerns that the second prong of
the Katz analysis-objective reasonableness-has come to do
much of the heavy lifting.50 In case after case, the Court essential-
ly concedes the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy be-
fore turning to devote extended discussion to the objective rea-
sonableness of this expectation.5 1 So, for example, in United
States v. Jacobsen, the Court surmised that Jacobsen probably
did not want the police to discover that the package he shipped
contained cocaine. 2 However, the Court quickly dismissed the
significance of this observation, noting that "an interest in priva-
cy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is, by its
very nature, critically different from the mere expectation, how-
ever well justified, that certain facts will not come to the atten-
tion of the authorities."53 The Court made no further comment on
Jacobsen's subjective expectation of privacy in the cocaine before
turning to its analysis of the objective reasonableness of Jacob-
sen's expectation. 54
Similarly, in California v. Ciraolo, the Court accepted that Ci-
raolo had "met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent
and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agriculture pur-
suits."5 However, as it had in Jacobsen, the Court immediately
dismissed the import of its observation for purposes of assessing
the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 6 The Court spent the re-
mainder of its decision discussing "the second inquiry under
Katz."57 Despite the Court's embrace of the objective assessment,
50. Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth
Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 377-78 (2006).
51. In other areas of the law, too, the Court has signaled a preference for objective
tests over more subjective inquiries. For example, when assessing whether a seizure has
taken place or whether consent to search has been granted, the Court's inquiry turns al-
most exclusively upon an objective assessment of the police conduct or the effect that con-
duct may have had on the target. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)
(finding that the appropriate standard for assessing whether a seizure had occurred to be
a "reasonable person" test). See generally Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasona-
ble: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773,
781-82 (2005) (discussing the Court's decision in Bostick).
52. See 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (explaining that the wrapped parcel in this case falls
within "the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy").
53. Id. at 122.
54. Id.
55. 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
56. Id. at 211-12.
57. Id. at 212.
1194 [Vol. 44:1185
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it has not clearly defined what that assessment entails. The next
section examines the problems created by the rise of the objective
reasonableness prong in the absence of clarity of its meaning.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT METHOD:
FUZZY DEFINITIONS PLUS TWO ANALYTICAL LEAPS EQUALS
LIMITS ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
One key advantage of the current method for defining searches
is that an analysis driven by objective reasonableness-instead of
subjective expectations-appropriately recasts the question of
Fourth Amendment application as a normative one: Where do we,
as a society, think the line should be drawn when it comes to offi-
cial intrusions upon privacy?5s However, problems persist. De-
spite the presumptive dominance of an objective assessment, the
Court has not fully refined the standard for purposes of defining a
search. In the absence of such clarification, the risk is that the
Katz test devolves into an amorphous standard that can be easily
manipulated to mean whatever the particular group of Justices
forming a majority on the date of decision wants it to mean. 9 In-
deed, detractors of the Court's current search jurisprudence rou-
tinely identify this as a critical weakness. Though far from the
only critique, 60 the most common complaint about the Court's cur-
rent search jurisprudence is that it offers little guidance to the
judges who are asked to apply it.61
The second prong of the Katz test-which drives that jurispru-
dence-has been criticized as "a virtually standardless concept of
58. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam noted more than three decades ago,
"[flortunately, neither Katz nor the fourth amendment [sic] asks what we expect of gov-
ernment. They tell us what we should demand of government." Amsterdam, supra note 22,
at 384.
59. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 28, at 791 (noting that "the Katz test itself is fluid,
vague, and liable to produce wildly varying results").
60. Commentators have also wisely noted that adoption of the third-party doctrine
and notions of risk assumption have done much to undermine the privacy protective value
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 31, at 122 (observing that the Court
has allowed knowing risk of exposure to be equated with an invitation for such exposure,
and has allowed minor intrusions upon privacy to justify subsequent larger ones).
61. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment: Toward an
Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641,
677 (2005) ("[Clurrent thinking about the Fourth Amendment... results in judges decid-
ing cases based on highly selective value judgments.").
2010] 1195
1196 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1185
reasonableness."62 And, as some commentators note, the failure to
adequately guide the normative query leaves our citizenry unpro-
tected against "the 'hydraulic pressures' favoring expansive police
power at the expense of privacy and liberty."3 Even some Justices
have complained that case outcome is at times motivated not by
any actual assessment of what is objectively reasonable, but ra-
ther by the caprice of the majority.r While there is merit in these
critiques, we need not toss the existing law and begin from
scratch.61
Though the Court has not defined precisely what it means by
objective reasonableness, it has suggested factors that are rele-
vant to the inquiry.66 Accordingly, while some argue that there is
no organizing principle that justifies the Court's treatment of en-
hanced surveillance, ' I disagree. A close review of the cases re-
veals that, with regard to sensory enhanced searches, the Court
has found the most relevant factor in the analysis to be the intru-
siveness of government surveillance. 68 In this context, the Court
does not use the term in its popular sense.69 Rather, beginning
62. Id.; see also Gruber, supra note 28, at 794 (noting "[t]he Court's tendency to twist
the reasonableness inquiry into a tool to undermine typical privacy expectations").
63. Morgan Cloud, A Liberal House Divided: How the Warren Court Dismantled the
Fourth Amendment, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 33, 72 (2005) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
64. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 549 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[The Court's] perception of what society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable is not based on any empirical data; rather it merely reflects the perception of
the four Justices who have joined the opinion that THE CHIEF JUSTICE has authored.").
65. Cf. Kerr, supra note 48, at 966 (noting that in the realm of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court "should tweak the law, not rework it from first principles").
66. The Court has said generally that the objective reasonableness prong of Katz can
be resolved by broadly referencing property law concepts. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 144 n.12 ("[Olne who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude."). The
Court has also legitimated subjective expectations that it finds align with the Framers'
notions of reasonableness. Id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Court on occasion also
has looked to history to discern whether certain types of government intrusion were per-
ceived to be objectionable by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment.").
67. David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches and the Irrelevance of the Fourth
Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 465, 467 (2007) ("The Supreme Court has failed
to develop a coherent body of law that governs sense-enhanced searches.").
68. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984) (finding that a
field test which revealed only the presence of cocaine was not a search).
69. Professor Kerr has suggested that the popular understanding of intrusiveness is
related to notions of surprise. Pursuant to his theory, "[tihe more surprising a technique
is, the more it jolts the status quo, the more it will upset expectations, and the more intru-
sive it will appear." Kerr, supra note 48, at 958. However, as Professor Kerr rightly ob-
serves, when intrusiveness is equated with surprise, "[m]easuring intrusiveness does not
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with Katz, the Court has used intrusiveness to capture two re-
lated inquiries: (1) what type of information does the govern-
ment's enhanced surveillance method uncover, and (2) how much
information can the surveillance device potentially disclose?70 De-
pending upon the answers to these two questions, particular
forms of enhanced warrantless surveillance are either approved
as constitutional or banned as unreasonably intrusive. For exam-
ple, the Court has used the intrusiveness inquiry to approve the
warrantless use of devices that secretly transmit the numbers di-
aled on a telephone, but has disapproved devices that secretly
record the substance of the conversation once the call is con-
nected.', The Court has also used the intrusiveness inquiry to au-
thorize both dog sniffs of closed containers and chemical field
tests for narcotics-procedures that the Court has repeatedly de-
scribed as occasioning only a trivial intrusion. 72 Similarly, aerial
photographs of private property are permitted as long as they re-
actually measure how much a technique infringes on civil liberties." Id. at 959.
70. In 2007, I described these two inquiries as examinations of the "quality" and
"quantity" of information. See Hutchins, supra note 20, at 431 nn.121 & 122. That termi-
nology and the underlying analysis are echoed by the Court of Appeals of New York in its
recent Weaver decision. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199-1200 (N.Y. 2009)
("What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and quantity, is a
highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associa-
tions-political, religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few-and of the pattern
of our professional and avocational pursuits.").
71. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (affirming the warrantless use
of a pen register), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (declaring unconstitu-
tional the warrantless monitoring of defendant Katz's conversation on a public pay phone).
Professor Kerr and others have suggested that the result in the Smith case was motivated
not by analysis under Katz, but by application of notions of consent. See Orin S. Kerr, The
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 587-88 (2009); see also Gruber,
supra note 28, at 802 (suggesting that Smith should be read primarily as a case governed
by the third party doctrine). Professor Kerr makes a robust argument in defense of his
theory. While I agree that consent has significant appeal as a rationale for the decision, I
question whether Justice Marshall's dissent in Smith, which noted that "[it] is idle to
speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no rea-
listic alternative," Smith, 442 U.S. at 750, applies with equal force to Professor Kerr's con-
sent theory. Cf. Colb, supra note 31, at 144-50 (explaining how the Court's broad construc-
tion of the consent (and related) doctrines has undermined the effectiveness of the Fourth
Amendment's protections). In any event, there is, without question, more than one lens
through which the Court's search jurisprudence can be understood. I posit that, for tech-
nologically enhanced investigations, the straightest line can be drawn through the existing
case law if it is organized around the notion of intrusiveness.
72. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (describing police use of a trained
narcotics detection dog as "much less intrusive than a typical search"); Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
at 122 (dismissing a chemical field test for cocaine as only a minimal intrusion because it
"could disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent").
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veal only minor details;73 however, thermal imagers that reveal
the intimate details of the home are not.74
Intrusiveness is a useful concept that captures, in many re-
spects, precisely what the Fourth Amendment was intended to
protect against. 75 As countless legal scholars have noted, the pro-
tections ensconced in the Bill of Rights were in no small part born
of the Framers' profound suspicion of a powerful police force.76
The Fourth Amendment, which is an example of the depth of this
suspicion, prevents the police from rummaging in our private af-
fairs at will. Substantial official surveillance would be abhorrent
to most Americans, even to those who are not doing anything
wrong.7 7 Intrusiveness as defined by the Court captures the offen-
siveness of such official rummaging.
However, noting that the Court has embraced a valuable tool
for assessing the constitutionality of various forms of enhanced
surveillance is not the end of the story. In employing that tool,
the Court has made two analytical leaps that together create an
undue contraction of the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
These two leaps are (1) the ascendancy of the first prong of the in-
trusiveness inquiry, and (2) a focus on whether challenged infor-
mation can theoretically be obtained by an unaided human being.
The contraction in protection occurs as increasing numbers of
new technologies are characterized as sense-enhancing devices-
73. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (affirming the warrant-
less use of a commercial camera in part because "EPA was not employing some unique
sensory device that, for example, could penetrate the walls of buildings and record conver-
sations in Dow's plants, offices, or laboratories, but rather a conventional, albeit precise,
commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking).
74. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (finding a search where the de-
vice used by police was highly intrusive in that it obtained information that could not
theoretically have been obtained by a human being without physical intrusion).
75. As Justice Scalia has observed, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment "is to pre-
serve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their proper-
ty that existed when the provision was adopted--even if a later, less virtuous age should
become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion 'reasonable.'" Minnesota v. Dicker-
son, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect per-
sonal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.").
76. E.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 35 (2009)
("The Bill of Rights intentionally makes it harder for the police to do their jobs."); Fred H.
Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 435, 451 (2008).
77. See Butler, supra note 76, at 88.
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a label which typically ensures the most lenient constitutional
treatment available.
As noted above, the intrusiveness inquiry invokes two parallel
considerations: (1) the type of information that can be accessed by
the government's enhanced surveillance method, and (2) the
amount of information potentially disclosed by the surveillance
device. On paper, an examination of intrusiveness suggests a ba-
lanced application of these two prongs. In practice, however, the
Court has made the first leap and focused far more on the "type"
portion of the inquiry. This imbalanced application of the intru-
siveness inquiry mirrors, in many respects, the Court's imba-
lanced application of the Katz test. Nevertheless, while there are
a number of good reasons for heavily favoring the objective in-
quiry of Katz's two-part test, the same cannot be said for favoring
intrusiveness's "type" analysis over its "amount of information
potentially revealed" inquiry. Nonetheless, in case after case, the
Court has given dominant consideration to the first prong-type
of information revealed-and considered as an afterthought (if at
all) the second inquiry-amount of information potentially re-
vealed.
For example, in Smith, the Court began with a discussion of
the type of information that was acquired by the government's
pen register.78 The Court found that the pen register should be
treated differently than the listening device in Katz, primarily be-
cause the type of information acquired by the two devices was
substantially different. 9 In contrast, beyond summarily describ-
ing the amount of information gathered by the pen register as
"limited," the Court engaged in no real analysis of the quantity of
information the device might collect.o As a result, constitutional
treatment of the pen register was driven almost entirely by the
Court's determination that it gathered the same type of informa-
78. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) ('These devices do not hear sound.
They disclose only telephone numbers that have been dialed.. . .'") (quoting United States
v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 431 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)).
79. Id. ("Yet a pen register differs significantly from the listening device employed in
Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications.").
80. Id. at 742 ("Given a pen register's limited capabilities, therefore, petitioner's ar-
gument that its installation and use constituted a 'search' necessarily rests upon a claim
that he had a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' regarding the numbers he dialed on his
phone.").
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tion available to telephone operators in the days when calls were
connected by human intermediaries. 81
Similarly, in United States v. White, the Court's ultimate de-
termination that no Fourth Amendment search occurred was
guided largely by its first-order observation that the type of in-
formation obtained by the challenged radio transmitter was not
significantly different from the notes a government agent might
take.82 As in Smith, after determining the type of information re-
vealed, the Court failed to conduct any serious analysis of the
amount of information potentially uncovered before reaching a
decision about appropriate constitutional treatment.8 3 Because
the Court saw little difference between the type of information
obtainable by the agent acting alone and the type of information
obtained by the transmitter, the Court refused to impose consti-
tutional limits.
The ascendancy of the first prong of the intrusiveness inquiry
is problematic for several reasons. First, intrusions upon our pri-
vacy are occasioned as much by the amount of information others
learn about us as by the type of information disclosed. For exam-
ple, most adults engaged in a single intimate relationship would
likely not object strenuously to the public disclosure of the name
of their current partner. Presumably though, that same group of
adults would look much less dismissively upon the release of a
comprehensive list of their sexual partners. The type of informa-
81. Id. at 744-45 ("Petitioner concedes that if he had placed his calls through an oper-
ator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a
different constitutional result is required because the telephone company has decided to
automate." (citation omitted)).
82. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971). For constitutional purposes, no
different result is required if the agent, instead of immediately reporting and transcribing
his conversations with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic
equipment which he is carrying on his person or (2) carries radio equipment which simul-
taneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or
to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. Id. (citing Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)).
83. Apart from the singular observation that the amount of information obtained by
the transmitter provided "a more accurate version of the events in question," the Court
made no further mention of the amount of information that could have been uncovered by
use of the radio transmitter. Id. at 753.
84. Id. at 751 ("If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electron-
ic equipment do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of pri-
vacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations made by the agent
or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking
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tion revealed in the second scenario is no different than that re-
vealed in the first, but because the quantity of information dis-
closed has changed, the intrusion is amplified. By elevating con-
sideration of the first prong, the Court ignores the significant
intrusion upon privacy that can be occasioned when large quanti-
ties of even a single type of seemingly innocuous information are
disclosed.
A secondary outgrowth of the ascendance of the first prong of
the intrusiveness inquiry is that the Court, despite eschewing a
bright-line-rules model of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
Katz,8 5 is gradually returning to more formalistic assessments.
The Court's focus on the type of information revealed creates cat-
egories of devices that can be characterized as either sense-
augmenting or extrasensory. The label the Court places on a de-
vice largely dictates its subsequent constitutional treatment. So,
for example, the Court has tended to treat devices it considers
sense-augmenting as presumptively constitutional.86 In contrast,
the Court views extrasensory devices as more intrusive.s' Accor-
dingly, the Court has permitted the warrantless use of such de-
vices only where the amount of information revealed is tightly
circumscribed. 8
Categorization is not entirely bad, and indeed there is much
good to be said about it.89 Though the Court has rejected an en-
85. Gruber, supra note 28, at 828 ("Reasonableness is the mechanism through which
the Fourth Amendment can be a fluid protector of rights, rather than an outmoded relic
tethered to no-longer-sufficient categories.").
86. Ramya Shah, From Beepers to GPS: Can the Fourth Amendment Keep Up with
Electronic Tracking Technology?, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POLY 281, 288-89 (2009).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (observing that dog sniffs "represent[ I a greater intrusion into an individual's priva-
cy" because they add "a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human percep-
tion").
88. The Court has considered three "devices" it deems extrasensory: the thermal im-
ager in United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001), the dog sniffs in Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005), and Place, 462 U.S. at 699, and the chemical drug test in United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984). It rejected the use of the thermal imager be-
cause the information it could obtain was not tightly circumscribed. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-
36, 38-39. In contrast, the Court permitted the dog sniffs and chemical field tests at issue
in Place, 462 U.S. at 707, Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, and Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123-24, be-
cause they could reveal only the presence or absence of narcotics but nothing more.
89. Though some scholars have advocated just such a "fix," see, for example, Morgan
Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 199, 301-02 (1993) (urging a rules-based approach to Fourth Amendment protec-
tions), I do not mean to suggest a return to the days when Fourth Amendment law was
strictly a matter of rigid adherence to the literal categories.
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tirely rules-based model of search jurisprudence, some categoriza-
tion provides helpful guides for quickly determining which devic-
es are permissible and which are not. In addition, when a clear
test is used, categorization can enhance predictability by permit-
ting a single case to govern the constitutional treatment of every
device (present and future) that falls within the ambit of the cat-
egory created. However, on the downside, when the test that pro-
duces categorization is too malleable, categorization can result in
a jurisprudence that does not adequately protect. This is precisely
what has happened in the case of the Fourth Amendment-it is
what I describe as the Court's second leap.
In conducting this "type" inquiry, the Court has focused on
whether information could theoretically be obtained by one of the
human senses. By focusing the inquiry as it has, the Court has
created a highly pliable standard that allows virtually everything
to be pushed into the permissive sense-augmenting category. For
example, in Smith, prior to refusing warrant protection, the
Court minimized the intrusiveness of the challenged pen register
by describing it as merely the modern day equivalent of a switch-
board operator. 90 Similarly, in Kyllo, arguing that a warrant
should not be required, the dissent went to great lengths to de-
scribe the thermal imager at issue in that case as a device that
only mimicked human perception. 91 In dissent, Justice Stevens
commented that "the ordinary use of the senses might enable a
neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a build-
ing, particularly if it is vented, as was the case here."92 Indeed, if
a judge is sufficiently imaginative, virtually any information dis-
closed in a surveillance-enhanced search could theoretically be
obtained by human surveillance. Consequently, the theoretical
human attainment standard is too easily manipulated.
Certainly, I am not the first to notice the shortcomings of the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. To address concerns
with the existing search jurisprudence, learned commentators
suggest a variety of new tests that they argue produce better out-
comes faithful to the purposes of the amendment. One such fix
advances legislative action in place of constitutional protection. 93
90. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
91. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. As noted by a number of scholars, privacy can also be protected through the draft-
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Another suggests completely discarding the warrant require-
ment.94 Others propose we move to an exposure-based approach
for defining searches.9 5 Some scholars even commend that we col-
lapse the Fourth Amendment's protection into notions of property
rights,96 while others submit the existence of a search should be
judged by the purpose of the official intrusion.9 Finally, as many
ing and enactment of appropriate legislation. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 22, at 839-57.
94. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV.
757, 800 (1994).
95. Professor Kerr suggests an exposure-based approach to defining searches. Specifi-
cally, Professor Kerr proposes that the government's exploration of a suspect's computer
hard drive should be defined as a search only at the moment when "information from or
about the data is exposed to possible human observation." Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Sei-
zures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REV. 531, 551 (2005). Though a thorough critique of
Professor Kerr's proposal is beyond the scope of this footnote, I make one brief observation.
Contrary to Professor Kerr's suggestion, his exposure-based approach cannot be justified
under the Court's decisions in Karo and Kyllo. Professor Kerr opines that his approach is
supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Karo because, in his view, that case ad-
vances the notion that constitutional lines are crossed only when the police retrieve useful
(or at least intelligible) information. Id. at 553 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
712 (1984)). But this is not the law. The Fourth Amendment is implicated as much when
the police officer first reaches into my handbag as when she finally closes her hand around
an unidentifiable object and pulls it out for closer observation. Indeed, the Court in Kyllo
recognized as much when it found that the thermal imager used by officers in that case
was objectionable not only because it actually revealed information about the interior of
the home, but also because of its potential to reveal such information. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37
(rejecting the government's argument that the police conduct in that case was constitu-
tional because it did not actually "detect private activities occurring in private areas"); see
also id. at 38 (observing that the thermal imager used in that case was objectionable not
only because of what it had revealed, but also because of what it "might disclose"); id. at
39 (observing that a rule which defined constitutional limits based on ex post examina-
tions of the information actually revealed would be unworkable because "no police officer
would be able to know in advance" what his enhanced surveillance would ultimately un-
cover). Put simply, it is the reaching, not just the retrieving, with which the Constitution
is concerned.
96. Cloud, supra note 63, at 72-73; see also Steinberg, supra note 67, at 485 ("In short,
the Fourth Amendment was intended only to regulate physical intrusions into houses and
not other types of searches or seizures."). Confining the definition of a search to a physical
intrusion into the home is ill-advised. Indeed, the Supreme Court determined almost fifty
years ago that the reach of the Fourth Amendment extended beyond mere notions of phys-
ical trespass. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
97. Under this line of analysis, if the police invade a protected privacy interest "with
the purpose of obtaining physical evidence or information," such conduct would be consi-
dered a search under the Fourth Amendment. Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a "Search"
Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006). However,
there are significant difficulties with binding constitutional protection too tightly to the
subjective intentions of the officer. First and foremost, subjective intentions can be diffi-
cult to accurately gauge. Indeed, adopting the purpose-based approach would seem an odd
response to the waning subjective expectation prong of Katz. Moreover, in other contexts,
the Court has signaled that an officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to an assessment of
Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 807, 813, 814
(1996) ("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis .... [Tihe Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain ac-
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scholars have noted, it may unnecessarily complicate things to
define the common sense occurrence of a search by referencing
personal desires (subjective expectations) and societal norms (ob-
jective reasonableness). 98 For such critics, a simple common sense
definition of the term would be more appropriate. 99
A detailed critique of each of the proposals exceeds the scope of
this essay. Accordingly, I note only that the usefulness of many of
these critiques is limited by their shared precondition-the sub-
stantial rejection of existing doctrine. Consequently, whatever
merit there may be in the proposals, their practical value is dimi-
nished by their stark improbability of actual adoption. Even with
several new members, there is little chance the Court will signifi-
cantly revamp the law of searches and seizures. For better or
worse, the presumptive warrant requirement and the Katz test
are, at least for the foreseeable future, here to stay. In light of
that continued vitality, it seems improbable that the Court would,
for example, retreat to Olmstead-like notions of the Fourth
Amendment's application.1° Similarly, adopting a dictionary-like
definition for Fourth Amendment searches would require that a
number of the Court's recently decided cases be overturned. 0' My
tions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent."); see also Hor-
ton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) ("[E]venhanded law enforcement is best
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.").
98. See generally Amar, supra note 94.
99. Id. at 769.
These word games are unconvincing and unworthy. A search is a search,
whether with Raybans or x-rays. The difference between these two searches
is that one may be much more reasonable than another. In our initial hypo-
thetical, the search is public-the agent is out in the open for all to see; non-
discriminatory-everyone is scanned, not just, say, blacks; unintrusive-no x-
ray glasses or binoculars here; consented to-when one ventures out in pub-
lic, one does assume a certain risk of being seen; and justified-the Presi-
dent's life is on the line. But change these facts, and the outcome changes-
not because a nonsearch suddenly becomes a search, but because a search at
some point becomes unreasonable.
Id. (footnote omitted).
100. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that wire tap-
ping did not constitute a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment as it was not "an
official search and seizure of his person [nor] such a seizure of his papers or material ef-
fects [nor] an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making
a seizure"), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
101. In Caballes, the Court reaffirmed that "the use of a well-trained narcotics-
detection dog--one that 'does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would re-
main hidden from public view,'-during a lawful traffic stop generally does not implicate
legitimate privacy interests." 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (quoting United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). However, there is little room to argue that a narcotics-detection
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proposed method for defining a constitutionally significant search
therefore works within the existing doctrine.
IV. ANTIDOTE: A NEW WAY OF THINKING
ABOUT INTRUSIVENESS
As discussed in Part III above, in flushing out the intrusiveness
inquiry applied to technologically enhanced searches, the Court
has taken two analytical leaps that limit the reach of the Fourth
Amendment. Those two leaps are the ascendancy of the "type"
query (to the detriment of any significant consideration of the
quantity query) and a dominant focus on whether information
could theoretically be discovered by a human being (as opposed to
consideration of whether the device employed obtained informa-
tion in an unreasonable manner). I propose that these two leaps
be undone to better guide the police and lower courts in assessing
whether the Fourth Amendment will be implicated.
My modified intrusiveness inquiry involves balanced considera-
tion of two factors-functionality and potential disclosure. The
two questions asked are how and what. First, the court must ex-
amine how the device in question enabled or enhanced surveil-
lance-"how does it work?" I call this the "functionality inquiry."
Next, the court must determine the extent of disclosure made
possible by use of the device-"what can be discovered?" I call this
the "potential disclosure inquiry." The functionality and potential
disclosure inquiries are then balanced to determine the relative
intrusiveness of official conduct and, thereby, the appropriate
constitutional treatment of challenged surveillance.
In contrast with the highly compliant human attainment query
that is now engaged, the first factor of my proposed test would
consider the actual functionality of a device.10 2 Such consideration
dog's actions do not fall squarely within a common dictionary definition of a search. See
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1120 (11th ed. 2003) (defining the verb
"search" to mean "to examine in seeking something").
102. Professor Kerr has suggested that rules should be adopted that do not require
judges to first become proficient in the technical functioning of particular surveillance
equipment. Kerr, supra note 95, at 552 (advocating a test that focuses judicial scrutiny at
the point of potential human exposure because "[iut is far easier for humans to control and
understand exposure than to control and understand the technical functioning of a com-
puter"). Admittedly, it would be simpler to leave the mystery of how things work to the
scientists and confessed gadget geeks of the world. But it is of negligible concern that un-
derstanding the precise functioning of surveillance equipment may at times be compli-
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would be used to assess whether the device is most properly cate-
gorized as "sense-augmenting" or "extrasensory." A sense-
augmenting device is one that merely enhances one of the five ba-
sic human sensesil-sight,14 hearing,105 taste, 16 smell °7 or touch.
In contrast, an extrasensory device is one that makes surveillance
possible by exploiting a mode of perception not physiologically
available to humans. 10 8 For example, binoculars are sense-
augmenting because they merely magnify the existing human
ability to detect electromagnetic waves in the visible range. Simi-
larly, a flashlight is sense-augmenting because alone it perceives
nothing; rather, it only improves the human ability to see by pro-
viding a source of visible light.109 In contrast, a field test for co-
cated. When Fourth Amendment protections hang in the balance, it is not the least unrea-
sonable to insist that the government present clear evidence of the technical functioning of
its challenged devices. Indeed, under my proposed inquiry, a court need only determine at
the outset whether the particular piece of equipment augments (or mimics) one of the five
human senses or instead does something the human senses cannot. While this assessment
does require some understanding of the precise method by which surveillance equipment
works, it hardly requires judges to become technocrats.
103. The human senses are physiological methods of perception. LINDA S. COSTANZO,
PHYSIOLOGY 69 (3d ed. 2006).
104. Sight describes the ability to detect electromagnetic waves in the visible range.
LAURALEE SHERWOOD, HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY: FROM CELLS TO SYSTEMS 6-15 (7th ed. 2010).
105. Hearing describes the ability to perceive sound. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 882 (2d ed. 1993).
106. Taste is one of the two "chemical" human senses. SHERWOOD, supra note 103, at
227. It describes the ability to detect sweetness, saltiness, sourness, and bitterness. Id. at
229.
107. Smell is the second "chemical" human sense. Id. at 227. It describes the ability of
chemoreceptors located high in the nasal cavity to detect thousands of odor molecules. Id.
at 227, 230. Animals are both more sensitive to smaller concentrations of chemicals and
have additional odor receptors that humans do not possess. Id. at 227. When a bloodhound
is following a scent trail, it is simply detecting smaller concentrations of odor chemicals
than a human would be able to. In other words, they are functioning not much differently
than a "microphone" for smell. In contrast, when a drug dog alerts, some studies have
found that the dog is identifying odor chemicals that cannot be detected by humans at any
concentration. See id. at 227, 230.
108. Hutchins, supra note 20, at 433.
109. The conclusion that flashlights are sense-enhancing devices-and their use, there-
fore, presumptively a non-search-is consistent with the Supreme Court's conclusion that
constitutional bars present no obstacle to the official use of artificial light sources. See
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (finding that "use of artificial means to illumi-
nate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth
Amendment protection"). Nonetheless, a technical purist might plausibly contend that ca-
tegorization of a flashlight as a sense-enhancing device is analytical deck-stacking, driven
more by the desire to achieve a particular legal outcome than by an objective assessment
of functionality. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001), with id. at 41
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (reflecting that disagreement regarding desired outcomes often
goes hand in hand with disagreement regarding functionality). Indeed, it is not implausi-
ble to suggest that flashlights should be categorized no differently than the fabled (and
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caine would be extrasensory because it uses chemical reactions to
accurately detect the presence of cocaine, something even the
human senses of taste and smell cannot do.110 A dog sniff for nar-
cotics would be similarly categorized."
The consequence of categorization during the first step of my
proposed analysis is a positive or negative presumption with re-
gard to application of the Fourth Amendment. Put more simply,
the Supreme Court has historically treated use of a sense-
enhancing device as a non-search that triggers no additional con-
stitutional concerns beyond those triggered by unaided police
conduct.' Conversely, the Court has implied that the use of non-
binary extrasensory devices should be deemed a search and thus
within the scope of Fourth Amendment protection."' As the Court
has at times recognized, though, an inflexible assignment of con-
stitutional treatment based simply on a device's functionality can
result in unduly formalistic results. Consequently, under my pro-
posed inquiry, rather than giving near-conclusive weight to the
assigned category, the initial determination of constitutional
treatment is only a preliminary judgment. After determining how
the device works, the next question to be answered is "what can
be discovered by use of this device?"
When considering the potential disclosure factor, a court would
examine the extent of information potentially revealed by the
surveillance device. Based upon what the court finds at this
stage, it can either reject the preliminary assessment of constitu-
tional treatment as unsuitable, or confirm it as appropriate. For
example, the presumption that law enforcement's use of an extra-
indisputably extrasensory) x-ray goggles for the human body, which is no better able to
generate visible light than to see through clothing and walls. However, if the proposed
functionality inquiry is properly understood to evaluate the mode of perception enabled by
use of the device, a flashlight is best classified as sense-enhancing for it improves, without
substantively altering, our ability to detect electromagnetic waves in the visible range.
110. Cobalt thiocyanate is widely used to test for cocaine. Anna L. Deakin, A Study of
Acids Used for the Acidified Cobalt Thiocyanate Test for Cocaine Base, MICROGRAM J.,
Jan.-June 2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/forensicsci/microgram/journal-vl/m
journal_vlpg6a.html. When added to water soluble cocaine, it reacts by turning blue. See
id.
111. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (ob-
serving that dog sniffs add "a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human per-
ception").
112. See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 381 (noting the historic observation "that the
eye or ear could not commit a search").
113. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (holding that a dog sniff only "discloses the presence or ab-
sence of narcotics" and thus "did not constitute a 'search'").
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sensory device deserves Fourth Amendment oversight might be
rejected as unjustified in a particular case if the court determines
during the potential disclosure inquiry that only a tightly circum-
scribed quantity of information can be revealed by the device in
question. 114 The opposite is also true: if a great deal of information
can be uncovered by official use of a sense-enhancing device, the
original non-search presumption might be rejected in favor of
constitutional protection. At bottom, the potential disclosure
analysis is about considering "how much information is too
much?" in the case of sense-enhancing devices, and is about ask-
ing "is the potential disclosure restricted enough?" in the case of
extrasensory surveillance tools.
Though the Supreme Court has never identified the precise
quantity of information necessary to override a preliminary pre-
sumption regarding constitutional treatment, it has given some
indication of what is sufficient. For example, though a field test
for drugs is an extrasensory implement, it is treated by the Court
as a non-search because it can determine only the presence or ab-
sence of a controlled substance. 115 Indeed, such "'binary'
search[es]," as some scholars have dubbed them,116 are the only
type of extrasensory surveillance that the Court has ever ap-
proved for warrantless use. By way of comparison, use of the
sense-enhancing microphone in Katz was treated as a search be-
cause of the vast quantity of information potentially revealed by
the device. 117 A hypothetical will help clarify how my proposed in-
trusiveness inquiry would operate in practice.
Assume Officer Eager is walking his assigned beat in a neigh-
borhood known for its frequent street-level drug sales. At the cor-
ner of Chance and Prospect Streets, Eager sees a legally parked
SUV. He can see the heads of two people sitting in the vehicle
through the clear front windshield. But, the height of the vehicle
and tinting on its side windows prevent a clear view into the
truck's interior. There is nothing about the appearance of the ve-
hicle that raises Officer Eager's suspicion. Nonetheless, he de-
termines that if he uses his binoculars while standing on steps
114. Cf. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,410 (2005); Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
115. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
116. See David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 36 & n.213 (1996) (quoting United
States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989), as the first instance of the term)).
117. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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across the street from the SUV, he can see into the vehicle
through a worn area in the tinting on the passenger window. Ea-
ger makes out Dealer handing Buyer a small baggie containing
white powder. Eager sees Buyer hand Dealer what looks like
money. Eager radios for backup, and when Buyer exits the ve-
hicle minutes later, he is arrested. A baggie of white powder is re-
trieved from his pants pocket. Dealer is also arrested. On the
floor in front of his seat, the officers find thirty-five baggies of
white powder identical to the one seized from Buyer. They also
search Dealer's person and find $480 in cash. If Dealer is charged
and moves to suppress the evidence at trial, there is little ques-
tion that Eager's binocular-enhanced observation from a lawful
vantage point on a public street would be deemed a lawful non-
search under current Supreme Court doctrine."8 A similar result
would also be produced under the proposed intrusiveness frame-
work.
Recall, under the intrusiveness inquiry a court asks two ques-
tions: "how does it work?" and "what can be discovered?" With re-
gard to the first query, the burden is on the government to pro-
duce responsive evidence. Presumably, with regard to the
hypothetical, the evidence produced would explain that Officer
Eager's binoculars relied upon his existing ability to detect elec-
tromagnetic waves in the visible range and then magnified the
images he detected. Because Officer Eager's binoculars merely
enhanced a mode of perception already physiologically available
to humans-the sense of sight-the court should classify the bi-
noculars as a sense-enhancing surveillance implement. This clas-
sification would trigger a preliminary presumption that use of the
device should be deemed a non-search not subject to the stric-
tures of the Fourth Amendment.
After determining that binoculars are a sense-enhancing device
-the use of which presumptively is not restricted by the Consti-
tution-the court would next consider the extent of potential dis-
closure to verify that constitutional oversight was unnecessary.
Specifically, the reviewing court would ask, "what could Officer
Eager have learned through use of his binoculars?" If the amount
118. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) ("[U]se of a searchlight is com-
parable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion."); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) ("There is no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy, shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be
viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers."
(citations omitted)).
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of information potentially disclosed is significant, this finding
may justify rejecting the initial non-search presumption. On the
other hand, if the degree of information potentially disclosed is
insignificant, this will validate the preliminary conclusion that
constitutional oversight is unnecessary.
In some sense, the extent of potential disclosure in the hypo-
thetical can be characterized as substantial. Though Officer Ea-
ger's binoculars can reveal no more than Eager might have dis-
covered had he held his bare eye to the untinted portion of the
SUV's window, it would not be unreasonable for one to press the
contention that a great deal might nonetheless have been
learned. Eager might have discovered any number of particulars
by peeking into the car, including the owner and his paramour in
flagrante delicto in the presumed seclusion of the rear seat. How-
ever, when assessing the magnitude of potential disclosure, sub-
jective notions should not be the measure guiding the analysis. To
improve the current state of Fourth Amendment law, the intru-
siveness inquiry must not only "limit[ ] the risk of intrusion on le-
gitimate privacy interests," it must also be a workable, reasona-
ble, and objective standard of constitutional protection.119 To that
end, guidance must be taken from the existing case law. In the
instant case, characterizing the potential disclosure as substan-
tial is inconsistent with such guidance. 120
The question is whether the potential disclosure is so signifi-
cant as to justify rejecting the presumptive treatment of sense-
enhancing devices. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has treated
visual observation as insignificant, provided the officer occupies a
lawful vantage point at the time of observation. 121 Consequently,
119. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 773 (1983). As the Supreme Court noted in
Andreas, when defining standards for searches one "must be mindful of three Fourth
Amendment principles. First, the standard should be workable for application by rank-
and-file, trained police officers. Second, it should be reasonable .... Third, the standard
should be objective, not dependent on the belief of individual police officers." Id. at 772-73
(citations omitted); see also Steinberg, supra note 67, at 474 (bemoaning the unpredictabil-
ity of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine).
120. As at least one scholar has complained, the Court's tendency to treat visual sur-
veillance somewhat more permissively than aural surveillance is problematic. See Stein-
berg, supra note 67, at 469 ("The Court is far more likely to require a warrant when tech-
nology enhances aural impressions, rather than visual impressions."). Steinberg is
correct-in many cases what one can see reveals as much, if not more than, what one can
hear. However, for purposes of this essay, I assume the continued existence of the distinc-
tion the Court has drawn.
121. I refer here only to the viewing of items that are visible to the public, and distin-
guish this from the "plain view" doctrine that has been carved out as an exception to the
warrant requirement to justify seizures. In the case of "observation of an object in plain
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where the mode of perception in the hypothetical is limited to
visual observation, the potential scope of disclosure does not justi-
fy overriding the initial presumption that Officer Eager's binocu-
lar-enhanced observations were a non-search. In sum, because
the binoculars rely upon a mode of perception that is already
available to humans, and because the information that can be un-
covered through the use of binoculars is limited to visual observa-
tions, their use by law enforcement is not restricted by the Fourth
Amendment any more than an officer's naked eye observations
would be.
But there would be little need for proposing a new test, if all it
did was regurgitate results that can be squared with existing cas-
es. 122 Instead, the benefit of my proposed modification to the in-
trusiveness inquiry is that it also allows for a more nuanced reso-
lution of inventive fact patterns. For example, assume that
instead of using a pair of binoculars, Officer Eager used a scan-
ning device with imaging capabilities that allowed it to scan the
interior of Dealer's car. Under existing case law, it is not entirely
sight," the Court has traditionally found that such viewing "generally involves no Fourth
Amendment search." Brown, 460 U.S. at 738 n.4; see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 375 (1993) ("[I]f contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer
from a lawful vantage point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment .... ."). The dis-
tinction between the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement and the observa-
tion of items in plain sight was also acknowledged by the Court in Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). There the Court noted,
[tihe "plain-view" doctrine is often considered an exception to the general rule
that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but this charac-
terization overlooks the important difference between searches and seizures.
If an article is already in plain view, neither its observation nor its seizure
would involve any invasion of privacy.
Id. The somewhat permissive treatment of visible items has also been noted by scholars.
See Steinberg, supra note 67, at 469 ("The Court is far more likely to require a warrant
when technology enhances aural impressions, rather than visual impressions.").
122. There are a handful of existing cases that would not survive under my proposed
modifications to the intrusiveness inquiry. For example, the warrantless use of the pen
register at issue in Smith v. Maryland would have to be rejected. 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1970).
Considering the actual functionality of the device, the pen register, which "decode[s] out-
going telephone numbers by responding to changes in electrical voltage caused by the
turning of the telephone dial (or the pressing of buttons on pushbutton telephones)," Unit-
ed States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977), would be categorized as extrasensory.
Turning to the potential for disclosure, the presumptive need for a warrant that attached
following the functionality inquiry could not be overcome by binary search results. Admit-
tedly, to the extent the results in that case are viewed as justified by the third-party expo-
sure doctrine, the inquiry I propose would not affect them, but would push that rationale
more squarely to the center of the analysis.
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clear which way the Court would rule.123 However, under the mod-
ified intrusiveness inquiry the outcome is clear.
At the first step of the intrusiveness analysis, the Court might
find that the scanner emitted ultra-wide-band radar waves that
traveled through the exterior of the car to detect objects and
movement in the interior. 124 Clearly this is not something that
any one of the five human senses is capable of doing. Therefore,
the device would be categorized as an extrasensory device, trig-
gering an initial presumption that its use should be deemed a
search (and therefore subject to the strictures of the warrant re-
quirement). In the case of extrasensory devices, the Court has on-
ly exempted them from the reach of the Fourth Amendment when
they provide binary results. The information disclosed by Officer
Eager's scanner, though analogous to the visual observations
enabled by the binoculars, would not be sufficiently restricted to
justify rejecting the presumptive treatment of extrasensory devic-
es. In other words, placing the modified intrusiveness inquiry at
the heart of the Fourth Amendment inquiry concerning enhanced
searches would impart greater structure to judicial consideration
of novel technologies, and will hopefully allow courts to issue
more uniform guidance when confronted with cutting-edge sur-
veillance enhancements.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment can be a powerful ally in the fight to
protect privacy. However, when it comes to technologically en-
hanced searches, the Court has engaged in two analytical leaps
that undermine our privacy protections. By refusing to repeat
these leaps in future cases, and by recalibrating the intrusiveness
analysis to consider the actual functionality of surveillance devic-
es, we can encourage a more vigorous protection of privacy inter-
ests while also remaining somewhat faithful to the course already
charted by the Court.
123. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (focusing on whether or
not there was a physical intrusion to privacy), with id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (fo-
cusing on inferences drawn from information ascertained through new technologies).
124. See, e.g., Kelly Hearn, High Tech Cop Tools See Through Walls, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, Apr. 18, 2001, available at http://www.commondreams.orgcgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/
headlines0l/0418-04.htm; Time Domain Corporation, Time Domain Receives Fundamental
Patent for Sense-Through-The Wall Radar Technologies, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.timedo
main.corn/news/wall.php.
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